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"THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO THEIR WRITINGS":
COPYRIGHT AND CONTROL IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Jane C. Ginsburg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Let me begin with an historical anecdote:
"In the beginning was the Reader." And the Reader, in a Pirandello-esque
flash of insight, went in search of an Author, for the Reader realized that without
an Author, there could be no Readers. But when the Reader met an Author, the
Author, anticipating Dr. Johnson, scowled, "No man but a blockhead ever wrote
except for money."I
And the Reader calculated the worth of a free supply of blockhead-written
works against the value of recognizing the Author's economic self-interest. She
concluded that the author's interest is also her interest, that the "public interest"
encompasses both that of authors and of readers.
So she looked upon copyright, and saw that it was good.
This, in essence, is the philosophy that informs the 1710 English Statute of
Anne (the first copyright statute), and the 1787 U.S. Constitution's Copyright Clause.
The latter provides: "Congress shall have Power. .. [t]o promote the Progress of
Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings ..."2 In the Anglo-American system, copyright enabled
the public to have "a supply of good books"' 3 and other works that promote the
progress of learning. Copyright did this by assuring authors "the exclusive Right
to their... Writings,"'4 that is, a property right giving authors sufficient control
over and compensation for their works to make it worth their while to be creative.
But that does not tell us how much compensation authors or other copyright hold-
ers should get from copyright, nor how much control they should be able to exer-
cise over their works. That turns on the scope of copyright protection, particularly
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University
School of Law. Many thanks for research assistance to Tucker McCrady and to Caroline Corbin,
Columbia Law School, both class of 2001. This article is based on the Godfrey Lecture deliv-
ered at the University of Maine School of Law on September 18, 2001. Prior versions of this
text appeared in Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Versus Control in the Digital Age, 7 N. Z. Bus. L.
Q. 136 (2001), Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemina-
tion, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001), and in Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Intermediate
Users' Rights, 23 COLUM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67 (1999).
1. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 316 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (quoting
Samuel Johnson).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech Before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in PROSE AND
POETRY 731, 733 (G.M. Young ed. 1967).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Both the Statute of Anne (England 1710) and the U.S.
Constitution's Copyright Clause highlight the role of exclusive rights in promoting the progress
of learning.
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with respect, nowadays, to new markets created by new technologies.
The recent coincidence of new technology and new legislation in the United
States may have enhanced the ability of U.S. copyright owners to wield electronic
protective measures to control the exploitation of their works. The legislation,
which reinforces the technology, has led many to perceive and to deplore a result-
ing imbalance between copyright owners and the copyright-using public.5 Critics
assert that the goals of copyright law have never been, and should not now be-
come, to grant "control" over works of authorship. Instead, copyright should ac-
cord certain limited rights over some kinds of exploitations. 6 Economic incen-
tives to create may be needed to achieve the goal of public instruction, but those
incentives should be as modest as possible. Copyright, the argument goes, has not
historically covered every way of making money from, or of enjoying, a work of
authorship; anything uncovered belongs in the public domain. Thus, when new
technologies spawn new markets for copyrighted works, we should not simply
assume that copyright owners ought to control those new markets.
There is doctrinal support for this contention. Indeed, there is a strong streak
of copyright skepticism in U.S. jurisprudence. 7 Moreover, the incentive rationale
for copyright invites its own rebuttal. For one thing, we may have an ample supply
of "blockheads," poets who bum with inner fire, for whom creation is its own
reward, or for whom other gainful employment permits authorial altruism. These
creators do not need the incentive of exclusive rights in order to produce works of
authorship. As to this group of authors, then, copyright might be a wasteful wind-
5. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections
on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 161 (1997); Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States:
Will Fair Use Survive, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to
Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1675-79 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law
in the New Millenium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 193 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the
Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 523 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Intel-
lectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be
Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Good News and Bad News on
the Intellectual Property Front, COMMS. OF THE ACM, March 1, 1999, at 19.
6. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, The Demonization of Piracy, Address to the Tenth Conference
on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (Apr. 6, 2000), at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2001); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y USA 365 (2000).
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 at 7 (1909) (because copyright is "not based upon any
natural right," legislation must balance the public benefit of the incentive effect against the
public detriment of a monopoly); Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Com-
mons (Feb. 5, 1841), in THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 197, 201 (Trevelyan ed. 1879)
(although copyright is "the least objectionable way of remunerating" authors, "[t]he tax is an
exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of human plea-
sures..."); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
AM. EcON. REV. 421, 429 (1966) (copyright protection is not necessarily "the best device for
inducing the optimal number of books"). Recently, economic analysis has been used frequently
to criticize copyright protection. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Lydia Pallas Loren,
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Sys-
tems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An




fall. Moreover, even if the incentive rationale justified some copyright control
and/or compensation, we may be allowing too much. That is, the scope of copy-
right protection may be more generous than is needed to spur initial creativity.
In the abstract, this critique may have some appeal, but it also has consider-
able practical disadvantages. For example, the scope of a work's protection could
not be known ex ante (thus permitting predictability in licensing), but would only
be discovered in the course of an infringement proceeding, in which the court
would address the question whether this incentive was necessary to create this
work. Obviously, it also is rather difficult to project how one would show whether
or not copyright was a necessary incentive in a given case. Then professor (now
Justice) Stephen Breyer once suggested that the case for the copyright incentive
rationale has not really been made, 8 but neither, I would suggest, has the case
against it. It depends who has the burden of proof: authors to justify copyright, or
users to justify non-protection.
If abstract arguments about economic incentives do not advance the discus-
sion, perhaps an appeal to history will. Copyright, its skeptics remind us, has not
historically covered every way of making money from, or of enjoying, a work of
authorship. 9 For example, the "first sale doctrine" (or, in non-U.S. terms, the "ex-
haustion doctrine") removes the resale and rental markets from copyright owner
control. 10 The fair use exception permits a variety of unauthorized reproductions
or derivative works, sometimes even for commercial purposes. I New technology
cases of the past, from piano rolls to cable television to video tape recorders, have
limited the scope of U.S. copyright, either by finding that the exploitation did not
come within the copyright holder's statutory rights, or, despite prima facie infringe-
ment, by finding fair use. 12
But the exercise and the rhetoric of control enjoy a long pedigree, too.13 The
historical, if now largely abandoned, division between common law and statutory
copyright rested on "publication," the distribution of copies to the public. 14 Until
8. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281,322 (1970) ("[T]he case for copyright in
books rests not upon proven need, but rather upon uncertainty as to what would happen if pro-
tection were removed").
9. See sources cited supra note 4. See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 331 (1989); Steve P. Calandrillo,
An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclu-
sive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Re-
ward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 316-23 (1998).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). But see id. § 109(b) (copyright owners retain rental right
control of sound recordings and computer programs).
11. Id. § 107. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994)
(commercial sound recording of a song parody may be fair use).
12. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56
(1984) (video tape recorders); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394,
405, 412-14 (1974) (cable transmissions); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1968) (cable transmissions); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (pianola rolls).
13. See generally EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1879) [hereinafter DRONE ON COPYRIGHT];
GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1847) [hereinafter CURTIS ON COPY-
RIGHT].
14. See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214-15
(llth Cir. 1999).
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that moment, the author controlled the decision and the implementation of public
disclosure of copies. Moreover, because of the peculiarities of the publication
doctrine under the prior U.S. copyright law and the state of technology before
mass market audio and audiovisual recorders, the copyright owner might economi-
cally exploit the work through extensive public performance, yet never lose con-
trol over the work because the public could not make copies from live or transmit-
ted performances of the work. Traditionally, the fair use doctrine was of little if
any application to unpublished works; the law strongly protected the author's con-
trol over public disclosure, for both economic and moral reasons. 15 Economic and
moral rights also underlie the development of the derivative works right, particu-
larly as applied to the control over adaptations of literary works. 16 Here, again,
Dr. Johnson reminds us of the venerable vintage of authors' objections to unautho-
rized adaptations. Boswell recounts a conversation about copyright in which he
evoked the view that one who memorizes another's work might legitimately pub-
lish the results of his recollections. Johnson objected, "No, sir, a man's repeating
it no more makes it his property than a man may sell a cow which he drives home."
Boswell then observed that under English decisions, "printing an abridgement was
allowed, which was only cutting the horns and tail off the cow." Retorted Johnson,
"No, sir, 'tis making the cow have a calf." 17
Copyright has evolved compromise measures as well, trading control for com-
pensation. The compulsory licenses ,that punctuate the reproduction and public
performance rights are one illustration. 18 Private organizations, such as the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. (BMI), which issue blanket performing rights licenses, are another ex-
ample. 19 A review of past confrontations between copyright and new technologi-
cal means of dissemination suggests that courts may be reluctant to restrain the
public availability of new technologies, even when they appear principally de-
signed to exploit copyrighted works, but Congress often has stepped in to assure
some form of compensation to copyright owners through imposition of a compul-
sory license. 20
In the digital environment, which approach to copyright and control will pre-
vail? Under the copyright owner control view, so long as the new technological
means of dissemination comes within the general scope of the statutory grant,
copyright holders should continue to exercise exclusive rights. Moreover, because
15. See, e.g., William S. Strauss, Study 29: Protection of Unpublished Works, in I STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 189 (Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 1963); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549-55 (1985).
16. See generally Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 209 (1983).
17. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511-
12 (1945) (quoting BOSWELL'S JOURNAL OF A TOUR TO THE HEBRIDES WITH SAMUEL JOHNSON 49
(Pottle & Bennett eds., 1936)).
18. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 118, 119 (2000).
19. See generally Bernard Korman & 1.4ored Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and
Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v USA 332 (1986).
20. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (cable), 115 (mechanical license) (2000). See also id. §
1201(k) (mandating copy control devices for analog videotape recorders, and prohibiting their
circumvention). An additional rationale for compulsory license schemes is reduction of the
transaction costs that negotiated licenses would impose. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen et al., An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383, 408 (1992).
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online licensing reduces transactions costs, and technological measures ensure
adherence to the terms of the license, copyright owners can now price discriminate
and offer access to works at increasingly granular levels of enjoyment.2 1 This
approach maximizes control, but also, at least in theory, is consumer-friendly be-
cause it tailors the price the consumer pays to her actual use of the work.
Under a view that privileges compensation over control, as long as authors get
paid something for new technological exploitations, anyone should be able to ob-
tain or make a copy of anything. 22 This view may converge with an "all you can
eat" style licensing mechanism: payment of a flat fee entitles the consumer to copy
whatever and however much she wants. 23 But will authors in fact be paid if they
cannot control price and manner of distribution? The exercise of control entails
the ability to set one's own price. Equally significantly, it empowers copyright
owners to select their licensees; licensees who must vie for the grant are likely not
only to bid up the price, but to offer assurances of quality control. As a result, one
might expect that authors will be paid less than they would be had they the power
to negotiate licenses (or to impose them on end-users). In addition, the administra-
tive costs of identifying users and authors entitled to a share of levy fees are also
likely to be prohibitively high if all authors are to be remunerated; these costs
might be reduced, but at the expense of niche authors that sampling techniques do
not discover.24 As a result, some might fear that authors will be paid so much less
that the incentive to create will be lost.
But perhaps the choice is not between being paid more or being paid less, but
between being paid less and not being paid at all. There remains a third more
radical paradigm: authors do not enjoy "exclusive rights" to exploit their works,
but only narrowly defined and uneasily tolerated opportunities to extract compen-
sation; these should in no event hamper the progress of technology. Under this
view, new markets created by new technology should not automatically enter the
author's purview. Moreover, the role of new technology should be user-empower-
ing as much as copyright holder-empowering. While new technology may en-
hance copyright holder control, it can also destroy it, because users as well as
copyright owners now may avail themselves of technological locks and keys. New
technology in users' hands can, and for some commentators should, strip authors
of any meaningful ability to control and enforce copyrights. 25 One might call this
last view "techno-postmodernism." Technology allows users to take what
postmodemism justifies as truly belonging to the audience in any event. Some
postmodemists tell us that a work's value comes not from its author's creativity,
21. See generally Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon,
Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CH.-KENT L. REV.
1367 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
22. Cf. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's so Fair About Fair Use? 46 J. Copy-
RmHT Soc'Y USA 513, 525-28 (1999) (suggesting limiting derivative works right to receipt of
compensation for unauthorized uses, but denying injunctive relief).
23. See, e.g., Copyright Issues and Digital Music on the Internet, 107th Cong. (July 11, 2000)
(testimony of James Hazen Griffin, CEO, Cherry Lane Digital), 2000 WL 23831279.
24. For a criticism of existing survey techniques, see Harvey Reid, ASCAP & BMI-Protec-
tors of Artists or Shadowy Thieves?, at http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/royalty-
politics.html (last visited on Feb. 4, 2002).
25. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 238, at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/download.html.
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but from the public's affection for the work.2 6 Without its public, the work is
nothing, 27 so the public should "share" in its value, perhaps by acquiring it for
free, if the technology so allows.
Will the technology so allow? This is a focus of the current dispute. On the
one hand, self-styled "cyber anarchists" invite us to "copyright's funeral," pro-
claiming that no protective measures that copyright owners devise will withstand
the efforts of hackers who will, moreover, avail themselves of pervasive yet un-
traceable means of file sharing to distribute the decrypted works and/or the
decryption codes. 28 Other copyright skeptics foresee the opposite, but equally
apocalyptic, result: copyright owners will impose "digital lockup," relying on tech-
nology, contracts, and law to banish fair use and drain the public domain. 29 Either
no copyright control can ever be enforced or, on the contrary, copyright control
will acquire Orwellian effectiveness. Either way, resistance will be futile; the only
thing that changes is the camp of the frustrated resister.
This article does not attempt to gauge future technology, whether protective
or anarchic. Rather, it addresses a basic premise underlying many of the current
critiques of copyright law in the wake of the 1998 U.S. Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (DMCA): that the DMCA has vested copyright owners with a power of
"control" that is fundamentally at odds with the U.S. copyright scheme articulated
in the U.S. Constitution and implemented through 200 years of copyright legisla-
tion preceding the 1998 amendments. I disagree. Instead, I contend that the Con-
stitution embodies the concept of author control. I acknowledge that the interven-
ing statutory and caselaw history until 1976 often elevated claims for enhanced
availability of works over copyright owner interest in exercising control over new
modes of exploitation. The 1976 Act, however, implements a vision of "exclusive
rights"'3 0 to which control is integral. This does not mean that the control implicit
in the author's "exclusive right" must be impregnable. Free uses and compulsory
licenses remain appropriate and necessary.3 1 But control is still very much a part
26. See, e.g., David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction
of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992) (arguing
that if intellectual property survives, it will no longer lend itself to a romantic construction of
authorship for the purposes of suppressing speech). Some critics take the somewhat less radical
position that copyright need not die, but that it must be revised to reflect the reality of a plural-
istic authorship process. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright
and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZOARTS & ENT. L.J. 293,302 (1992) (arguing that the notion
of romantic authorship on which copyright law is based fails to reflect the reality of contempo-
rary polyvocal writing); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 307 n.97 (1996) (listing-but disagreeing with-several copyright
and literature scholars who "assert that a misguided natural rights approach, together with ves-
tiges of nineteenth-century Romanticism, has pushed copyright in the direction of a full com-
mon law property right, a right that is immune to claims of public access").
27. Apre-postmodemist film expressed it this way: promoter [Spencer Tracy] to boxer: "Who
made you, Huckle?" "You, Mike." "Who owns the biggest piece o' ya?" "You, Mike." "What'll
happen if I drop ya?" "I go right down the drain, Mike." "And?" "And ... and stay there." PAT
AND MIKE (MGM 1953).
28. See e-mail from June M. Besek, Director of Studies, Kernochan Center for Law, Media
and the Arts, Columbia Law School, to Jane C. Ginsburg (Sept. 27,2000, 12:38 p.m.) on file wih
author) (quoting newsgroup conversation).
29. See sources cited supra note 4.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).




of the U.S. copyright system. The technological protections, further secured by
legal protections, that may be required to preserve control, should also be seen as
part of, rather than alien to, that system.
In this article, I will explore the concept of control and the meaning of exclu-
sive rights in the constitutional text, the pre-1976 Copyright Act regime, and the
1976 Act. I then consider the new technology cases from piano rolls through vid-
eotape recorders, as well as Congress' responses to new technological means of
exploitation. I make two submissions. First, I conclude that when copyright own-
ers seek to eliminate a new kind of dissemination, and when courts do not deem
that dissemination harmful to copyright owners, courts decline to find infringe-
ment, even though the legal and economic analysis that support those determina-
tions often seems strained, not to say disingenuous. Second, this does not always
mean, however, that courts refuse protection or that Congress imposes a compul-
sory license, each time copyright encounters new technology. Rather, when copy-
right owners seek to exploit the new modes of communication, the courts and
Congress appear more favorable. In these circumstances, they embrace the propo-
sitions not only that copyright owners should get something for the new exploita-
tion, but, more importantly, that when the new market not merely supplements but
rivals prior markets, copyright owners should control that new market, and there-
fore should be able to charge market prices. 32
I will conclude with a somewhat different consideration: Even assuming that
copyright doctrine supports the exercise of control over new media of dissemina-
tion, is this power misplaced if it primarily benefits industrial-strength copyright
owners, as opposed to authors themselves? The current debate over copyright
control focuses on perceived or potential overreaching by powerful intermediar-
ies; the prospects for authors most often are overlooked. Greater author control
not only enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of copyright, it also may offer
the public an increased quantity and variety of works of authorship, as authors
whom the traditional intermediary-dominated distribution system have excluded
now may avail themselves of digital media and accompanying copyright controls
to propose their creations directly to the public (and be compensated for them).
H. AUTHORS' "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT"
The Constitution authorizes Congress to "secure" to authors "the exclusive
Right to their ... Writings. . . -33 In eighteenth-century terms, "exclusive right"
meant property. Madison, in the Federalist Papers, supported this measure by
emphasizing both the public benefit to be derived from authors' private rights, and
that the authors' exclusive right had already been recognized in England as "a right
at common law."'34 Copyright was a property right like other property rights, vest-
ing its owner with control over its disposition. The constitutional text's employ-
ment of the word "securing" demonstrates that the property right was not for Con-
gress to create, but rather to reaffirm and to strengthen. That right included exclu-
sive control over the work before its publication, as well as the right to prevent
unauthorized copying, selling, and publicly performing thereafter.
32. See id. §§ 106(6), 114(d) (digital sound performance right in sound recordings: compul-
sory license for webcasting, but exclusive rights for interactive services).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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If the Constitution perceived copyright as a form of property, the early statutes
implementing the Copyright Clause significantly qualified that characterization.
Congress recognized only the rights to "print, reprint, publish [and] vend," and
only with respect to certain subject matter: maps, charts, books.3 5 More impor-
tantly, Congress imposed a prerequisite of compliance with formalities: publica-
tion without compliance forfeited the copyright. 36 Congress recognized rights of
public performance and of dramatization and translation relatively late,37 hence
the federal copyright law did not assure to authors control over the full economic
value to be derived from their published works.
But it is important to recall that federal copyright law concerned only pub-
lished works. As long as the work remained unpublished, the author's exclusive
right was exclusive indeed, because the common law continued to govern. At first
blush, it might appear that exclusive rights in unpublished works would be of little
economic value. In fact, common law copyright protected not only the right to
publish a work, meaning to make the first distribution to the public in copies, but
also the right to public performance of unpublished works. 38 In other words, pub-
lication, the all-important dividing line between common law copyright and its
regime of exclusive control on the one hand, and federal copyright's limited pro-
tection on the other, did not mean the same thing as public disclosure or public
exploitation of a work. So long as the work was not distributed to the general
public in copies, the author or right holder was deemed to have retained common
law copyright over the work,39 and to be entitled to enforce against unauthorized
copying or publicly performing. Thus, a vast public might have seen an unpub-
lished work performed, still, it remained unpublished, and therefore not subject to
the limitations of federal copyright.
As a practical matter, this meant that copyright owners of works whose eco-
nomic value derived from their performance, rather than their publication in cop-
ies, enjoyed a significant measure of legal control over their works. For works
whose economic value also or primarily lay in distribution of copies, however,
federal protection was quite slim, until supplemented by performing rights and
derivative works rights. With the inclusion of those rights, as well as with the
expansion of federal subject matter,40 copyright owners who complied with for-
malities could assert exclusive claims to perform publicly for profit,4 1 to repro-
duce and distribute their works, or to make adaptations of their works. Copyright
35. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, Sec. 1, Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
36. See id. Sec. 3; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 692-96 (1834).
37. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565,
26 Stat. 1106 (repealed 1909).
38. See, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424,435-37 (1912); Crowe v. Aiken, 6 F. Cas. 904,
906 (C.C. N.D. I11. 1870) (No. 3,441); Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32,45 (1882); 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 950 (1836).
39. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907); Estate
of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1999).
40. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (prints); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4
Stat. 436 (musical compositions); Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (dramatic compo-
sitions); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (photographs); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230,
16 Stat. 198, 212 (paintings, drawings, sculpture, and models or designs for works of the fine
arts).
41. See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870) (granting right to dra-
matic compositions and the right to public performance thereof).
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owners could, moreover, control access to a work, whether published or unpub-
lished, that was made publicly available primarily through performances, and later,
transmissions. Until the advent of mass market audio and video recording equip-
ment, the public could not acquire access to a work without purchasing a copy, or
borrowing one from a library or a friend, or viewing/listening to it through media
licensed by the copyright owners.
The 1976 Act largely merged federal and common law copyright, leaving only
"un-fixed" works within the domain of the common law.42 Congress integrated
unpublished works into federal copyright law, making both published and unpub-
lished works substantially subject to the same regime. 43 Several considerations
motivated the merger: for the reasons suggested above, the distinction between
published and unpublished works bore little economic significance, as many "un-
published" works were in fact substantially exploited to the public; unpublished
works enjoyed perpetual protection, while the term of published works was lim-
ited by statute; common law copyright was a matter of state law, but the interstate
and international exchange of "unpublished" works counseled application of uni-
form federal law.44 One effect of the merger was increasingly to align federal
copyright with natural property rights conceptions of common law copyright: fed-
eral copyright now commenced upon creation, rather than upon publication to-
gether with compliance with formalities. 45
Moreover, the 1976 Act conferred broadly-stated exclusive rights, qualified
by narrowly-drawn exceptions and limitations. 46 Thus, where under prior Acts
copyright owners were required to show that the specific statutory language en-
compassed the unlicenced exploitation,4 7 under the 1976 Act, in effect, exclusive
control supplied the default position; the burden then shifted to unlicensed exploit-
ers to show that a specific exemption or limitation applied.48 The prominence of
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
43. Some differences persist. Under section 104, unpublished works are protected regardless
of the nationality of the author, while nationality is relevant for published works; under section
107, the fair use doctrine is applied less generously to unpublished works; under section 108,
libraries are given wider exemptions in the photocopying of unpublished works; under section
302 (c) and (e), the duration of protection for anonymous and pseudonymous works and works
made for hire is measured from publication or creation; and under section 303, works created
before 1978 but not yet published are protected for a different duration; and under section 407,
deposit for Library of Congress purposes is mandatory for works once they are published. Id. §§
104, 107, 108, 302(c), (e), 303, 407.
44. See Strauss supra note 14; Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for
Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070 (1977).
45. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5-
6(1987).
46. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275,
281 (1989). Compare the 1909 Act and predecessors: even when the term "exclusive rights" is
employed, the rights are stated more specifically, more in the style of English law "restricted
acts."
47. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 397, nn.1-2;
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. at 394-95, nn.9-10; Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1931); Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 593-95
(1917); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1911).
48. The expansion in scope of exclusive rights, and the corresponding narrowness of excep-
tions and limitations has put considerable pressure on the fair use doctrine to absorb and excuse
prima facie infringements that nonetheless appear to be reasonable uses. See Litman, supra note
45, at 340-42.
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exclusive rights in the 1976 Act also reflects Congress' response to Supreme Court
decisions narrowly interpreting the scope of the exclusive right of public perfor-
mance under the 1909 Act.49 Those decisions, in turn, illustrate the judiciary's
frequent reaction to infringement suits that appeared designed to prevent the ex-
ploitation of new technological means of making works available to the public.
III. THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
At first blush, the new technology cases, from piano rolls to videotape record-
ers, might appear to support the proposition that every time a copyright owner tries
to control a new dissemination technology, technology wins. In fact, the cases fall
into two distinct categories. The first covers new technological modes of dissemi-
nation of works, when copyright owners seek not to obliterate the technology, but
to be paid for the new means of exploitation, for example, radio broadcast of mu-
sical compositions. Here, copyright owners have generally prevailed.50 The sec-
ond category comprehends new technological modes of dissemination of works,
when copyright owners are perceived to be trying to prevent these new means
from becoming available to the public. This is the class of cases in which copy-
right owners have consistently fared ill.5 1 Even with respect to the second cat-
egory, however, copyright owners have not always remained remedy-less. Con-
gress has often imposed a compromise, allowing continued exploitation of the
technology, but with remuneration to the copyright owners, in other words, substi-
tuting compensation for control. I first will consider the relevant cases; I will then
turn to the legislative responses.
One of the first new modes of dissemination that copyright owners sought to
participate in, rather than to prevent, was radio broadcasting. The relatively newly-
formed collective licensing society, ASCAP, offered performance rights licenses
to radio stations. The broadcasters declined the licenses on the statutory ground
that their broadcasts were neither public performances "for profit," because there
was no charge to hear the music, 52 nor were they "public," because the perfor-
mances were received in private homes. 53 The broadcasters also advanced the
49. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 405; Fortnightly Corp.
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. at 400-01. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63
(1976) ("[T]he concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the initial
rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted
or communicated to the public. Thus, for example: a singer is performing when he or she sings
a song; a broadcasting network is performing when it transmits his or performance...; a local
broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broadcast; a cable television system is
performing when it re-transmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is perform-
ing whenever he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or communicates the
performance by turning on a receiving set.").
50. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 51-52, 55-56.
51. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 456 (1984);
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 405; Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. at 400-02; White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. at 17-18; Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
52. See, e.g., Pastime Amusement Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 2 F.2d 1020, 1020 (4th Cir.
1924) (mem.); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 777, 780 (D.N.J. 1923);
Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Mem'l Radio Fund, 46 F Supp. 829, 829-31 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).




economic ground that songwriters were not harmed, because the broadcasts pro-
moted sales of sheet music and sound recordings of the songs. All of these de-
fenses failed. 54
Courts had already evolved an expansive doctrine of "public performance for
profit" for live performances in establishments open to the public, even when no
admission was charged. 55 The transmission to individual homes required a greater
doctrinal leap, as the 1909 copyright statute did not elaborate on the meaning of
public performance. 56 Courts adopted the common sense view that these trans-
missions communicated the performance to the public, even though the members
of the public might be separated in space. Economic concerns may underlie this
reasoning: if the public can hear the band's or orchestra's performance at home for
free, why incur the expense and inconvenience of going to the performance in the
concert hall? Radio was competing with licensed live performances, as well as
opening up a new market for at-home enjoyment of those performances. 57
Retransmissions of radio broadcasts of music over closed-circuit systems in
hotels proved another source of licensing disputes, with hotel operators contend-
ing the transmissions were not to the public if they were received in private guest
rooms. Again, the issue was not whether the hotel operators could avail them-
selves of the technology; rather it was whether they were obliged to pay the au-
thors for the exploitation by means of the new technology. In upholding the copy-
right owners' claims, Justice Brandeis remarked, "While this [form of exploita-
tion] may not have been possible before the development of radio broadcasting,
the novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts to give full
protection to the monopoly of public performance for profit which Congress has
secured to the composer."'58
When, however, the Supreme Court perceived that copyright owners were
seeking to prohibit a new form of reproduction and distribution, or to leverage
their exclusive reproduction rights into monopoly power over the devices employed
to effect the new kinds of reproductions, the Court has been considerably more
reluctant to "give full protection to the [copyright] monopoly." An early case in
this vein, White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co.,59 decided in 1908, concerned pianola
rolls. The musical composition was reproduced onto the piano roll through perfo-
rations that, when run through a player piano, would perform the musical compo-
sition. The Supreme Court nonetheless held that the unauthorized pianola rolls
were not infringing "copies" because, unlike sheet music, the musical composition
54. See supra notes 51-52.
55. See, e.g., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. at 594-95.
56. Cf. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "perform publicly," includes by
transmission).
57. The first radio cases concerned broadcasts of music performed in studios, rather than
prerecorded music. See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F at 777; Jerome
H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d at 411. Thanks to economist
Michael Einhorn for discussing the substitution effect early radio broadcasts were perceived to
have with licensed live performances.
58. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. at 198 (playing copyrighted musical compo-
sitions broadcast from radio station via hotel loudspeakers is infringing performance). For a
more recent version of the problem, with a similar outcome, see On Command Video Corp., v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (closed circuit video trans-
missions to hotel guest rooms).
59. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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was not directly perceptible from the perforations. 60 The majority so held despite
Justice Holmes's objection that "[o]n principle, anything that mechanically repro-
duces that collocation of sounds ought to be held a copy.....,61
The Court's decision is best understood in light of the then-nascent recording
industry.62 It appears that the Court anticipated that unauthorized pianola rolls
would not furnish the only challenge to music copyright owners' exclusive repro-
duction rights.6 3 The Court may have suspected that the music publishers were
endeavoring either to prevent the distribution of a new format that competed with
sheet music, or, equally perniciously, to control the market for phonogram record-
ing equipment and phonograph players. Indeed, music publishers initiated the
case as part of a plan between music publishers and a manufacturer of phonogram
recording equipment to establish that the copyright extended to mechanical repro-
duction, and then to transfer mechanical recording rights to a single establishment,
in return for a kickback on sales of recording equipment. 64 A victory in the piano
roll case thus would bode ill for the nascent recording industry; the logic of Justice
Holmes's concurrence clearly applied as well to other forms of mechanical record-
ing.
Solicitude for a nascent dissemination industry also underlies the Court's de-
terminations in two controversies in which it held that cable retransmissions of
broadcast television did not involve a "performance" of the works, and thus fell
outside the copyright monopoly.65 In one case, the cable retransmission enhanced
local signals; in the other, it imported distant signals. The Court determined that
the retransmissions did not "perform" the works contained in the signals because
performance implied active conduct, while the retransmission was more passive.
In the first case, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 66 the Court
distinguished cable retransmission from a performance on the ground that cable
was more akin to mere "viewing" than "performing." 6 7 The analogy held even
when, in the second case, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.,6 8 the "viewer" reached out to bring in programming not otherwise available
in that area.69 The Court's analysis is rather strained,70 and should be seen in the
context of its perception that the broadcast industry was endeavoring to kill off a
60. Id. at 18.
61. Id. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring).
62. For a general overview, see WALTER L. WELCH & LEAH BRODBECK STENZEL BURT, FROM
TINFOIL TO STEREO: THE ACOUSTIC YEARS OF THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 1877-1929 (1994).
63. Moreover, at the time of the decision, player pianos enjoyed considerable popularity;
thousands of player pianos and millions of piano rolls had been sold. White-Smith Music Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. at 9.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 6-8 (1909) ("These contracts [between music publishers and
a mechanical reproduction company] were made in anticipation of a decision by the courts that
the existing law was broad enough to cover the mechanical reproduction, and one consideration
on the part of the reproducing company was an agreement that that company would cause suit to
be brought which would secure a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States"). On the
tactics of the music industry, see generally, PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT's HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND
LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 64-77 (1994).
65. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. at 400-402; Teleprompter
Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 405.
66. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
67. Id. at 399-400.
68. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
69. Id. at 408-09.
70. Or "simplistic," see id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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new rival, cable. 7 1 In addition, the Teleprompter majority contended that televi-
sion broadcasters and copyright owners would not be harmed by distant signal
retransmissions, because they could adjust their advertising rates to account for
the broader audience. 72 Thus, copyright owners appeared to be behaving like
unseemly monopolists, while in the Court's perception the new technology in fact
would not harm, but might in fact expand, their traditional markets.
Given those considerations (and in hindsight), the Court's decision in the
"Betamax" controversy 73 might seem like "[dijd] vu all over again."'74 There,
motion picture producers sued the manufacturers and distributors of mass market
video tape recorders, on the ground that the recorders facilitated massive uncom-
pensated and infringing private copying. 75 On a traditional copyright analysis, the
dissent is considerably more carefully reasoned than the majority opinion, 76 which
treats the statutory fair use factors rather cavalierly, and strains the doctrine of
contributory infringement to exculpate devices that are "merely capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses," perhaps regardless of the actual infringing use to which
they are put.77 The majority's extraordinarily forgiving approach is best under-
stood in light of the features the controversy shared with the cable cases. First, the
motion picture industry was attempting to prevent the distribution of video tape
recorders, in favor of a different technology, non-recordable videodisc players.7 8
Second, the majority found no economic harm to existing markets from "time-
shifting" of free broadcast television programming (having excluded other kinds
of copying or programming from its analysis). 7 9 The dissent charged the majority
with focusing on the wrong market; the court should have inquired into the impact
of the video tape recorder on new markets for television programming, not merely
on extant television markets. 80 This objection recalls the cable cases as well, where
the dissenters observed, particularly in Teleprompter,81 that the technology had
71. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. at 403 (Fortas, J. dis-
senting) ("[I]t is darkly predicted that the imposition of full liability upon all CATV operations
could result in the demise of this new, important instrument of mass communications; or in its
becoming a tool of the powerful networks which hold a substantial number of copyrights on
materials used in the television industry.").
72. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 411-13.
73. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
74. Yogi Berra, Famous Yogi Berra Quotes, available at http://www.yogiberraclassic.org/
quotes.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
75. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 440.
76. This may well be because Justice Blackmun's dissent was to have been the majority
opinion, until Justice Stevens rallied sufficient colleagues to his dissent to shift the outcome.
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 149-57. See generally Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin,
The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1993).
77. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 442. The "merely ca-
pable" standard may be dictum, since the record indicated that the predominant use for the
videotape recorder at the time was for "time-shifting" free-broadcast television, this is the non-
infringing use the "Betamax" majority found. Id. at 421.
78. For a full and fascinating account of the business as well as the legal aspects of the
"Betamax" case, see generally JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND
THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1987).
79. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 456.
80. Id. at 483-86.
81. 415 U.S. at 412.
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opened up a new market, that normally would come within copyright owner con-
trol, and the majority responded that copyright owners could nonetheless extract
revenues from the new markets. 82 While the "Betamax" majority did not project
what benefits the new technology would bring copyright owners, that outcome is
well-known (and frequently asserted against subsequent copyright owner objec-
tions to new technologies of copying). 83
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision in a controversy between the recording
industry and the manufacturers of the "Rio" portable MP3 player also demon-
strates that courts will interpret the statutory grant of rights narrowly if they per-
ceive that copyright owners are trying to stop technology.84 In that case, the Re-
cording Industry Association of America sought to enjoin distribution of the Rio
on the ground that the Rio violated the terms of the 1992 Audio Home Recording
Act,85 because the Rio was a "digital audio recording device" that did not incorpo-
rate the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) mandated by the statute. 86 The
district court had held that the Rio was a device covered by the statute, and that the
producers therefore were obliged to pay a statutory royalty for each machine sold,
but that the SCMS requirement was irrelevant, as the Rio was not capable of mak-
ing serial recordings in any event. 87 Both sides appealed. The Ninth Circuit held
that the Rio was not a "digital audio recording" device, and therefore was exempt
both from the SCMS requirement, and from any obligation to pay royalties. 88 The
question whether the Rio was a device covered by the statute was a difficult one.
The device did not itself record MP3 files directly from the Internet; a general
purpose computer performed that task, then transferred those files either to the
Rio's internal memory, or to a memory card that could be played in the Rio.89
Even though the Rio did not initiate the recording of MP3 files, one might none-
theless determine, as did the district court, that the transfer from a computer hard
drive to the Rio's memory required the Rio to make its own reproduction of those
files; as a result, the Rio could be deemed a "digital audio recording device." 90 If
82. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 412-13, 419.
83. For example, Napster defenders regularly point to the economic benefits the movie in-
dustry reaped from the videocassettes technology at issue in Sony. Reply Brief of Appellant
Napster, Inc. at 20, Napster Inc. v. A&M Records, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-
16403); Sam Costello, How VCRs May Help Napster's Legal Fight, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD
(July 25,2000) athttp://www.thestandard.com/article/display/O,l 151,17095,00.html ("The simi-
larity in the court of public opinion that Napster is going for is that the film industry hated the
VCR, hated Betamax, they wanted to wipe it out, but it turned out to make them a lot of money.")
(quoting Eric Scheifer, a media analyst); Richard B. Simon, Music Fans Buying What They
Hear Online, Study Says, Sonicnet.com News (June 16, 2000), at http://www.sonicnet.com/
news/archive/story.jhtml?id= 1021472.
84. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d at 1076-
81.
85. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000). The genesis of this statute is discussed infra in Part
(IV)(B).
86. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d at 1075.
SCMS allows the recorder to make "first generation" copies from the original source, but not to
make further copies from the first generation copy.
87. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d, 624,
629-32 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
88. Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d at 1081.
89. Id. at 1074-75.
90. Id. at 1076.
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the Ninth Circuit rejected that reasoning, it may at least in part have been influ-
enced by the RIAA's apparent desire to block distribution of the Rio altogether,
rather than simply to receive a royalty from its sale.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL COMPROMISES: MUTING CONTROL FOR COMPENSATION
In many of the new technology cases, courts faced with what appeared to be
all-or-nothing attempts at copyright enforcement, preferred to interpret the statute
in a way that would leave the copyright owners with nothing.9 1 Congress, how-
ever, has often readjusted the balance by imposing a compulsory license scheme
that permitted continued distribution of the new technology, while assuring pay-
ment to copyright owners. While the early forms of statutory intervention gener-
ally removed copyright owners from control over the licensed exploitation, more
recent versions combine compensation with control, or even restore a degree of
control, notably by specifying how copyright owners may employ technology to
protect their works from copying.
A. Compensation in Lieu of Control
The 1909 Act established the first compulsory license regime. After White-
Smith, record producers sought to preserve the free rein the Supreme Court had
left them, while copyright holders endeavored to repair the loss of exclusive rights
wrought by their ill-fated litigation strategy. The Senate, less moved than the Court
by the claims of new technology, was initially disposed to restore full exclusive
rights. 92 The House, however, sought to reconcile the right of the composer to
prohibit mechanical reproduction with a public policy to prevent "the establish-
ment of a mechanical-music trust."9 3 The House feared that music copyright owners
"by controlling these copyrights [would] monopolize the business of manufactur-
ing [and] selling music-producing machines, otherwise free to the world. ' 9 4 Copy-
right on the music should not result in an additional patent on the machinery. Con-
91. This reaction to perceived copyright owner overreaching is not limited to new technology
cases. It underlies the articulation of the "idea/expression merger" doctrine, which precludes
protection for expression that cannot be separated from the idea, system, or process it expounds.
Thus, for example, a copyright owner who endeavored to exercise a monopoly in his system of
bookkeeping on the ground that defendant copied from his copyrighted book the charts neces-
sary to implement the system found himself with no copyright at all. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 107 (1880).
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,976 & n. 18 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), by contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that the videotape recorder
violated the motion picture producers' reproduction rights, but suggested that the district court
on remand could craft a judge-made compulsory license that would permit continued distribu-
tion of the devices, subject to a royalty paid to the copyright owners.
92. See S. REP. No. 6187 at 3: "Some protest has been heard from the manufacturers of
mechanical musical instruments against any legislation which would control their unrestricted
right to use the property of others for their private gain, but this protest has been so manifestly
selfish that it has only served to impress upon the committee more strongly the injustice of the
existing state of the law." Although the Senate Report preceded the Supreme Court's decision,
the Senate committee was reacting to lower court decisions in the same case, which had also
held for the defendant. Id. See also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. at
12 (discussing earlier cases).
93. H.R. REP. No. 2222 at 7 (1909).
94. Id.
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gress ultimately diverged from the White-Smith holding by extending the repro-
duction right to mechanical reproductions, but then substantially limited the ex-
clusivity of the right. The legislative compromise gave the composer the exclu-
sive right to determine if any recording would be made at all, but once the first
recording was authorized, any other record producer was entitled, upon obtaining
the statutory license and paying the statutory fee, to make its own recording of the
musical composition.9 5 This measure thus compensated copyright holders, but
permitted the development of a recording industry, by ensuring competition among
record producers and the manufacturers of the phonograph equipment.
The cable retransmission compulsory license introduced in the 1976 Copy-
right Act followed a similar pattern. After the Supreme Court had held that the
retransmissions were not "performances," Congress defined "performance" in ex-
tremely broad terms amply sufficient to cover the conduct at issue in Fortnightly
and Teleprompter. Congress then instituted a complicated compulsory license
scheme designed to permit retransmission of local and distant signals, but subject
to payment of the statutory license fee, as well as to a requirement that the cable
operator not change the content of the retransmitted signal in any way.96
B. Some Compensation, Some Control
More recently, Congress has introduced more complicated ways of splitting
the difference between the control that exclusive rights implies and the fostering
of new technologies of dissemination. For example, the 1992 Audio Home Re-
cording Act (AHRA) was a post-Betamax measure designed to respond to the per-
ceived threat to the music industry (record producers and musical composition
right holders) from digital audio recording media. Copyright owners contended
that digital audio recorders would harm sales of authorized phonorecords, because
digital recorders, unlike analog devices, could make perfect multigenerational copies
of the recorded music.97 Having learned a lesson from Betamax, copyright own-
ers cooperated with hardware manufacturers in proposing to Congress that the
distribution of digital audio recording devices be permitted, subject to a statutory
royalty on the equipment and blank recording media, and so long as the devices
allowed the recording only of a first-generation copy. In other words, copyright
owners conceded a de facto license to make private digital copies from the original
recorded source, in return for a royalty that would help compensate for the copy-
ing.98
On the other hand, copyright owners secured control over second-generation
copying, because the statute curtailed copyright owners' exclusive rights only for
the first generation, and more importantly, because the statute mandated the inclu-
sion of the Serial Copy Management System in every covered digital audio re-
95. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1925) (repealed 1978).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000); see also WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F2d
622, 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
97. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-873 (I) at 18 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578,
3588. ("The genesis of the legislation was concern by copyright owners that the fidelity of
digital reproductions of recorded music would lead to massive unauthorized copying, signifi-
cantly displacing sales").
98. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010. Note that § 1008 bars infringement actions for private
analog copying, without a corresponding statutory remuneration. Id. § 1008.
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cording device. SCMS recognizes when a copy has been made, and prevents fur-
ther copying from that copy. In addition, the AHRA made it unlawful to offer
services or to distribute devices primarily designed to circumvent SCMS.9 9 For
the first time, Congress reinforced exclusive legal rights by providing for techno-
logical measures to protect those rights, and then by granting additional legal pro-
tection to those technological measures. As publishing lawyer Charles Clark often
proclaimed, "[tihe answer to the machine [may be] in the machine," 10 0 in that an
anti-copying device may forestall rampant digital reproductions; technology might
therefore fix what technology breaks. But, given that a third machine will likely
come along to defeat the second, leaving copyright entirely up to technological
fixes may simply produce a never-ending "arms race." 10 1 Congress recognized
that preservation of exclusive rights in a digital environment may require not only
technological adjuncts, but a legal cease fire in the form of a prohibition on cir-
cumvention.
Congress applied a similar approach of mandating a technological response to
private copying in a provision of the DMCA addressed to analog video tape re-
cording. In Betamax, the Supreme Court had held that time shifting of free broad-
cast television programming was fair use; the Court explicitly side-stepped the
questions whether retaining copies and whether taping cable or other forms of
paying television were fair uses. In the DMCA, Congress closed the open ques-
tions, by mandating the inclusion of copy-protection technology in all new or newly-
repaired analog video recorders. 102 When a user attempts to record from encoded
prerecorded tapes or transmissions, any copy the compliant recorder makes will be
substantially unviewable. Congress also made it unlawful to circumvent the copy-
protection system. As part of the scheme, Congress prohibited copyright owners
from encoding free broadcast television transmissions. Thus, private analog vid-
eotaping of free broadcast television transmissions will remain unrestricted and
uncompensated by a statutory license but copyright owners will be able to control
copying of pay television programming, and of commercially produced videocas-
settes that are sold or rented.
Seen in this light, Congress' addition in the DMCA of a new level of copyright
owner control, through the legal protection of technological measures, is consis-
tent with a pattern of ensuring that exclusive rights remain exclusive when entre-
preneurs or users of new technologies propose not merely to "share" in a new
market that the technologies have opened, but to undermine the rewards drawn
from the old. At least, that claim can be made of the DMCA provisions on circum-
vention of measures protecting "a right of the copyright owner" 10 3 -essentially,
technological protections against copying. But those provisions have not provoked
the same ire as the prohibition on circumvention of technological measures con-
99. Id. § 1002(c).
100. Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF COPY-
RIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139 (P. B. Hugenholtz ed., (1996).
101. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217,251
(1996).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k).
103. Id. § 1201(b).
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trolling access to a work, 104 principally because users are used to autonomy in the
enjoyment of their copies. But that may change. If one believes that the market
for hard copies is likely to recede as works become ubiquitously available through
audio- and videostreaming and downloading, then obtaining access will become
the principal way in which works are enjoyed. As a result, control over access will
become the principal way that exclusive rights are exercised. 105 Without control
over access, copyright owners may be disinclined to make their works available in
ways tailored to the evolving consumption habits of individual users.
V. AUTHORS' EXERCISE OF CONTROL
Thus, legal protection of access may encourage copyright owners to offer more
kinds of distributions, from pay-per-view to unlimited copying, but this presumes
that the technological measures that back up these offerings can in fact be en-
forced. As a practical matter, this means that users can be persuaded to refrain
from rampant copying through file sharing and dissemination of circumvention
hacks. In the post-Napster world, it would be a foolish copyright owner indeed
who assumed that users' consciences are quickened by the direction in the decalogue,
"Thou shalt not steal." 1° 6 Copyright owners will therefore have to be able to
compete with "free."
How? Depending on the kind of work, copyright owners might offer auxil-
iary services, such as updates of informational works, or helplines for software. 107
For more freestanding kinds of works, particularly entertainment product, copy-
right owners might propose auxiliary goods, such as fan club merchandise, or at-
tractive packaging. In general, if the digital copy can be bundled with a hard copy
whose disposition the copyright owner can regulate, control may yet survive. But
this depends on the hard copy's retention of independent value as an object, such
as a beautifully bound book, or as an artifact, such as an autographed CD cover.
Alternatively, copyright owners may persuade consumers to switch to a new for-
mat; this has happened before, when consumers, convinced of the new format's
superior convenience and durability, switched from vinyl LPs to CDs. One may
104. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414-29 (1999); Julie E.
Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive,
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1999, 21(5), 236; Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in
the New Millenium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 193,202-04 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Law
of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 538-39 (1999); Litman, The
Demonization of Piracy, supra note 5; L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause,
47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 365 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digi-
tal Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Good News and Bad News on the Intellectual Property
Front, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Mar. 1999, at 19.
105. See Jane Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY (Hugh
Hansen ed., forthcoming 2002) available at http://papers.ssm.com/5013/apers.cfm?abstract
_id=222493.
106. Exodus 20:15.




anticipate that, unlike current CDs, the next consumer-desirable format (perhaps a
DVD audio that holds 100 songs) will be access- and copy-protected. 108
Perhaps most likely, copyright owners might offer consumer convenience:
they can make it easier to access and copy with a license than without one. A
licensed download of audio or videostream would need to be easier to find, faster
to acquire, and give a better quality copy than a "shared" file or a hacked down-
load. Indeed, in the digital environment, given the easy manipulability of unpro-
tected documents, copyright owners may enhance the attraction of licensed copies
by assuring their authenticity. The price, if low enough, or varied enough, would
be worth the savings in transaction costs of finding the file or downloading the
hack and using it. Technological protections remain relevant to this system, since
the transaction costs of unauthorized access and copying are increased if the user
has to circumvent, and if at least some of the circumvention activity and device
market can be discouraged through the anticircumvention provisions of the DCMA.
Similarly, technological protections can ensure that the document delivered has
not been altered.
Finally, what has all this to do with authors? The Framers of the U.S. Consti-
tution provided that the "exclusive Right" was to be "secur[ed] ... to Authors,"10 9
not directly to publishers, producers, or other intermediate exploiters. The control
that non-author right holders enjoy derives from the rights the Constitution en-
sures to creators. If authors do not benefit from the control they cede, then con-
cerns about the potential incursion on public prerogative achieved through techno-
logically enhanced means of control assume greater force. If authors drop out of
the copyright balance, we should more carefully watch the weight of the right
holders.
But do authors have to drop out? Employee authors and others subject to the
"works made for hire" rule, 110 are cast out of copyright, since the statute deems
their employers and hiring parties the "author."111 Moreover, in many sectors,
creators who retain authorship status nonetheless assign all rights for a small roy-
alty, or even a flat one-time payment. 112 Perhaps, then, just as 18th-century pub-
lishers advanced their claims through appeals to the moral justice of remunerating
108. It is also possible that some users, like supporters of public radio and public television,
will be willing to pay a subscription or even per use, because they perceive a need to support the
dissemination of quality content that would not otherwise be available in a purely market or
advertising-based model.
109. U.S. CoNs., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
110. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2000).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., MICHELE VESSILLIER-REssi, THE AUTHOR'S TRADE: How Do AUTHORS MAKE A
LIVING? 69, 197 (John Hargreaves, trans., John M. Kernochan, ed.) (1993). Not surprisingly,
author organizations oppose assigning all rights. On its website, the American Society for Jour-
nalists and Authors "reiterates its opposition to WMFH [works-made-for-hire] or all-rights con-
tracts ...... ASJA Contracts Committee, Work-Made-For-Hire And "All Rights" Contracts, at
http://www.asja.org/new/pubtips/wmfh01.php (last visited Feb. 4, 2002). Similarly, the Au-
thors Guild advises: "Never transfer or assign the copyright." The Authors Guild, Improving
Your Book Contract: Negotiation Tips for Eight Typical Clauses, at http://www.authorsguild.org/
contractadvice.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
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authors whom they promptly despoiled, 113 today's copyright rhetoric of control is
merely a pretext for corporate greed.114
Indeed, one might suppose that authors would be better off with a compulsory
license regime than an "exclusive right," at least if a statute guaranteed creators a
fixed and generous percentage of the sums collected under the license. 118 But the
conclusion that a compulsory license regime is better for authors than exclusive
rights presumes that authors are obliged in practice to give up their rights to a
publisher; it disregards the potential of digital media to free authors from the cor-
porate distributors on whom they once depended to bring their work to the public.
Traditionally, publishers have performed or overseen the following functions: se-
lection; editing; reproducing the work in copies for distribution; distributing; mar-
keting, including advertising and promotion; and accounting to the author for roy-
alties. Today, some of these functions are no longer required and others can be
disaggregated; we can foresee that authors may undertake many of these tasks
themselves, or subcontract them without giving up their copyrights. Similarly,
freelance authors who can self-distribute may more effectively resist hiring par-
ties' attempts to contract into work for hire status. As a result, it would be prema-
ture to surrender the control the copyright law vests in authors, at least if that
surrender despairs of authors' abilities effectively to manage their own copyrights
in a digital environment.
113. See, e.g., the 1777 petition of the advocate Cochu on behalf of the Paris publishers,
reprinted in E. LABOULAYE & G. GUIFFREY, LA PROPRIfTt LITTtIRAIRE AU XVIIIr SItCLE (Paris
1859), at 159-98. For a brief history of early copyright development, see generally John Feather,
Authors, Publishers and Politicians: the History of Copyright and the Book Trade, 10 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 377 (1988).
114. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Counter Culture: Dot-communist Manifesto, NEW
YORK TIMEs MAGAZINE, June 11, 2000 available at http://bits.westhost.comI061200/counter3.htm;
Hane C. Lee, Another Voice Enters the Napster Debate, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, June 5, 2000,
available at http://www.thestandard.com/article10,1902,15718,00.html. For a musician's
perspective, see Lars Ulrich, Science Technology column, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2000, available at
http://www.rapstation.com/files/news/archive/Newsweek_com-NewsweekUSEdition
_Science_and_TechnologyItsOurProperty.html. Cf. Neil W. Netanel, Market Hierarchy and
Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000).
115. Urhebergesetz, German Copyright Act, Amendments of Mar. 1, 2002 relating to reason-
able remuneration §§ 54 ff, arts. 32, 32a, 32b, 36, 36a. See also Calandrillo, supra note 8 at 338-
39.
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